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The anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) has been the focus of intense research interest in recent years.
Although separate theories relate ACC function variously to conflict monitoring, reward processing,
action selection, decision making, and more, damage to the ACC mostly spares performance on tasks that
exercise these functions, indicating that they are not in fact unique to the ACC. Further, most theories do
not address the most salient consequence of ACC damage: impoverished action generation in the
presence of normal motor ability. In this study we develop a computational model of the rodent medial
prefrontal cortex that accounts for the behavioral sequelae of ACC damage, unifies many of the cognitive
functions attributed to it, and provides a solution to an outstanding question in cognitive control
research—how the control system determines and motivates what tasks to perform. The theory derives
from recent developments in the formal study of hierarchical control and learning that highlight
computational efficiencies afforded when collections of actions are represented based on their conjoint
goals. According to this position, the ACC utilizes reward information to select tasks that are then
accomplished through top-down control over action selection by the striatum. Computational simulations
capture animal lesion data that implicate the medial prefrontal cortex in regulating physical and cognitive
effort. Overall, this theory provides a unifying theoretical framework for understanding the ACC in terms
of the pivotal role it plays in the hierarchical organization of effortful behavior.
Keywords: anterior cingulate cortex, prelimbic cortex, hierarchical reinforcement learning, cognitive
control, effort
The anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) has been implicated in a
wide range of seemingly irreconcilable cognitive functions
(e.g., Bush, 2009). We recently proposed that many of these
functions can be captured by assuming that the ACC motivates
extended behaviors to achieve larger task goals (Holroyd &
Yeung, 2012). This hypothesis harmonizes well with recently
documented verbal reports of a patient receiving intracranial
ACC stimulation:
I started getting this feeling like . . . I was driving into a storm . . . Like
you’re headed toward a storm that’s on the other side, maybe a couple
of miles away, and you’ve got to get across the hill and all of a sudden
you’re sitting there going how am I going to get over that, through
that? (Parvizi, Rangarajan, Shirer, Desai, & Greicius, 2013, p. 1361)
Couched within the formal theoretical framework of hierarchical
reinforcement learning (HRL; Sutton, Precup, & Singh, 1999), our
theory of ACC function holds that the ACC exploits computational
efficiencies afforded by collections of actions that are represented
together based on their conjoint goals, called “options” in the
language of HRL, that allow for behavior to be selected on the
basis of superordinate tasks that are manipulated at higher levels of
abstraction (Botvinick, 2012; Botvinick, Niv, & Barto, 2009;
Hengst, 2012). In this view, ACC stimulation encouraged the
patient to execute an extended, difficult task (like traveling miles
to pass through a storm) rather than any task-related action in
particular (such as turning a sharp bend in the road). In contrast to
alternative theories of ACC function, the HRL theory also cru-
cially accounts for behavioral sequelae of ACC damage, namely,
slowed responding and reduced motor activity that, in extreme
cases, is observed as akinetic mutism, or the near absence of willed
behavior despite normal motor capability (Holroyd & Yeung,
2012)—predicting that ACC damage would have attenuated this
patient’s motivation to drive through the storm. Yet although the
theory is consistent with a wide range of data, it has still to be
instantiated in a computational model that makes explicit its un-
derlying assumptions, while demonstrating its internal consis-
tency. In the present study, we develop such a model.
The model addresses two prominent, competing ideas about
ACC function. First, numerous studies have indicated that the
ACC is responsible for linking chosen actions with their associated
reward outcomes in the service of supporting adaptive behavior
(Rushworth, Buckley, Behrens, Walton, & Bannerman, 2007;
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Walton, Croxson, Behrens, Kennerley, & Rushworth, 2007).
When formalized according to principles of reinforcement learning
(RL)—a body of algorithms used to train autonomous agents to
navigate uncertain environments to obtain rewards and avoid pun-
ishments (Sutton & Barto, 1998)—this hypothesis suggests that the
ACC serves as an “actor” mechanism that adaptively regulates
behavior according to feedback received from the environment
(Holroyd & Coles, 2002). By contrast, most existing computation-
ally specific theories of ACC function propose a role for this brain
area in performance monitoring (e.g., W. H. Alexander & Brown,
2011; Botvinick, 2007; Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Co-
hen, 2001; J. W. Brown & Braver, 2005; Shenhav, Botvinick, &
Cohen, 2013; Silvetti, Alexander, Verguts, & Brown, 2014; Sil-
vetti, Seurinck, & Verguts, 2011), a function that is more closely
related to a “critic” mechanism in the language of RL (Holroyd &
Coles, 2008). Further, other neural systems, such as the striatum,
are also believed to implement an actor-related RL function, which
raises the question of whether the ACC brings added value to
solving RL problems (Holroyd & Yeung, 2011, 2012). Thus,
despite a rich theoretical framework from which to draw (Sutton &
Barto, 1998), a specific actor-related function for the ACC has yet
to be precisely specified (but see Khamassi, Lallée, Enel, Procyk,
& Dominey, 2011, for a recently proposed alternative). Our mod-
eling efforts provide such an account.
Second, several prominent theories implicate the ACC in the
deployment of cognitive control (e.g., E. K. Miller & Cohen,
2001). Although we have suggested that trial-to-trial changes in
ACC activation related to control processes such as conflict mon-
itoring may be incidental to its core function (Holroyd & Yeung,
2012), the HRL theory also holds that sustained activation of the
ACC ensures ongoing control over task performance. Accordingly,
we propose an actor-related mechanism for the ACC that specif-
ically delineates its role in supporting cognitive control. The model
also presents a possible answer to an unresolved question in
control research: Previous theories have posited that the frontal
cortex represents task-related, contextual information that biases
information processing in other neural systems, especially when
surface features of the task elicit overlearned or automatic re-
sponses that are inappropriate for the given task context (e.g., J. D.
Cohen, Dunbar, & McClelland, 1990; Kimberg & Farah, 1993).
This control mechanism has provided a foundation for numerous
studies examining trial-to-trial changes in response times (RTs;
e.g., Botvinick et al., 2001), but has left unspecified how the
system determines what task to execute in the first place, and how
vigorously and carefully the task should be carried out (Umemoto
& Holroyd, 2014). Accordingly, our computational model links the
cognitive control and RL literatures to demonstrate how the con-
trol system utilizes reward-related information to select and moti-
vate particular tasks for execution. In so doing, the model demon-
strates that an actor mechanism described within the HRL
framework can encompass many of the cognitive control-related
characteristics attributed to the ACC.
In sum, we present a computational model of ACC function that
addresses these challenges while demonstrating that the proposed
function is fragile to neural insults. This work develops an earlier
suggestion that the ACC guides action selection by deciding be-
tween which of several possible high-level action plans to follow
(Holroyd & Coles, 2002) in the context of our more recent HRL
theory of ACC function. Because nonhuman animal studies have
provided a wealth of fertile data that are not readily obtainable in
humans, and because rodent behavior studied in the laboratory is
simple enough for model simulation, we focused our initial efforts
on understanding the rodent medial frontal cortex. The model
proposes a hierarchical relationship between the prelimbic cortex,
the ACC, and the striatum, each of which control an effortful
process on the basis of a common set of principles carried out at
differing levels of abstraction. This formal instantiation of the
HRL–ACC theory provides a means for explicitly delineating the
theory’s underpinning assumptions while also demonstrating its
internal consistency.
Computational Theory
The model is based on three principles related to hierarchy,
control, and reinforcement (Holroyd & Yeung, 2011, 2012). These
principles are implemented in an abstract RL framework that
captures the higher level computational goals of the system, as
opposed to a detailed neural model that is more biophysically
realistic (M. X. Cohen & Frank, 2009). Although the model
simulates rat behavior, its structure is informed by data from both
rat and primate (including human) studies, as described in what
follows.
Hierarchy
For problems characterized by hierarchical structure, represent-
ing sequences of behavior as temporal abstractions can enhance
computational efficiency by reducing the size of the problem
space. Consider that it is usually easier to plan a road trip as a
sequence of high-level goals (e.g., drive to the nearest town, stop
for lunch, get gasoline, and so on) rather than as a computationally
exhaustive sequence of actions that compose those goals (e.g.,
open the car door, sit in the driver’s seat, and so on). In the
language of HRL, the high-level actions constitute options that
represent options-specific action policies, where each policy is
described by a rule or algorithm that indicates what “primitive”
action to elicit for each environmental state encountered. The
policy can consist as a single set of stimulus–response mappings
that is applied over and over again, such as “turn left at each rock
and turn right at each pine tree,” or as a sequence of actions, such
as “follow the trail until it reaches the lake”—the unifying prin-
ciple being that it is usually more tractable to learn about the policy
as a whole rather than about the individual actions that comprise
the policy. In principle, representing tasks at higher levels of
temporal abstraction can facilitate problem solving by manipulat-
ing behavior at the task level rather than at the level of primitive
actions (Botvinick, Niv, et al., 2009). Our simulations assume that
the medial frontal cortex exploits such hierarchy.
By definition, hierarchal theories describe systems composed of
at least two levels. In the case of HRL, these consist of a higher
level that selects options and a lower level that selects primitive
actions specific to the option in play—hereafter simply called
“actions”—so as to maximize value relative to the overarching
option (Sutton & Barto, 1998). Following RL convention, we
assume that subjects navigate through a “gridworld,” wherein each
element of the grid represents a particular location in the environ-
ment. The simulated animal transitions from cell to cell each time
the action level selects among five possible actions: moving north,
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55HIERARCHICAL CONTROL OVER EFFORTFUL BEHAVIOR
south, east, or west, or not moving (“sitting”). In turn, the higher
option level selects and maintains an option that guides the lower
action level—which is to say that it selects and maintains the task or
behavioral strategy. Thus, for example, if the option level were to
select cleaning dishes over doing laundry, then the action level would
be biased to execute actions consonant with the goal of cleaning
dishes because only those actions maximize option-specific value.
Of course, many real-world problems are sufficiently complicated
for a hierarchical system to benefit from more than two levels of
abstraction. For instance, in a typical task-switching experiment, hu-
man participants are asked to switch between different tasks from trial
to trial. As we have described it here, the individual stimulus–
response mappings associated with each task would be carried out by
the action level, whereas the task itself would be selected at the
options level. But these particular options only make sense in the
higher level context of performing the experiment itself, which af-
fords the opportunity for selecting between the tasks. Alternatively,
the subjects might have chosen to participate in other competing
high-level behaviors, such as going to the beach, which would afford
a different set of options (e.g., swimming, sunbathing, playing vol-
leyball, and so on), each of which would come with their own set of
options-specific actions. We term this third level of abstraction as a
“metaoption” level that specifies a set of metaoptions, in which each
metaoption comprises a set of meta-option-specific options. Our
model thus contains three levels (see Figure 1). In principle, more
levels could be possible, but three are sufficient to demonstrate the
core principles of the HRL theory. Furthermore, because rodent
subjects are normally compelled to participate in their experiments,
the metaoption level consists of only a single metaoption correspond-
ing to the experiment itself.
To be specific, the task environment for each experiment is
described by an 11  11 gridworld, in which each cell constitutes
a unique environmental state (s). Experiments are separated into
trials (T) divided into discrete time steps (t). At each time t, five
potential actions (a) are allowable from any state s: moving one
cell north, south, east, or west, or remaining in the same cell
Figure 1. Schematic of frontal midline function. Bottom: The striatum and other brain areas select low-level
actions on the basis of learned values of future reward relative to the energetic costs of executing those actions.
Action selection is determined probabilistically over choices to move north, south, east, or west, or to sit.
Energetic costs incurred by action selection are attenuated by a top-down control signal supplied to the striatum
by the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). Middle: The ACC selects and implements high-level options, such as
whether to execute a task based on allocentric (place task) or egocentric (response task) frames of reference, as
determined by integrating across trials the reward received during option execution and relative to a cost
associated with switching between options. The ACC regulates the degree of control over the striatum according
to whether rewards received are better or worse than the average for the option in play. Top: The prelimbic cortex
implements the metaoption to participate in the experiment or not and applies control over ACC to regulate the
cost of switching between options. The degree of prelimbic control is determined according to whether rewards
are better or worse than average across the experiment.
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56 HOLROYD AND MCCLURE
(“sitting”). Each trial terminates when a primary reward (r) is
encountered or when t  500, whichever occurs first. Action
selection is governed by a three-level hierarchy, with levels (L)
from 1 to 3 (L  1–3) that select actions, options, and metaoptions,
respectively, according to the softmax equation (Sutton & Barto,
1998):
PL(oL1, oL, s)
eL
1QL(oL1, oL, s)
oM1nL eL
1QL(oL1, oM, s)
(1)
where PL (oL1, oL, s) is the probability that level L selects from
state s option oL specific to the option oL1 selected by level L 
1. Options oL correspond to actions, options, and metaoptions for
L  1–3, respectively. nL indicates the number of options available
at level L: n1  5 (one for each action), n2  1 or 2 (as determined
by the experiment), and n3  1 (which enforces the selection of a
single metaoption—the experiment). L is a level-specific temper-
ature constant that regulates the relative probabilities of option
selection (L  0 for all L) (Sutton & Barto, 1998). Note that trial
notation T and time notation t are dropped for convenience;
metaoption and option selection occur at the start of each trial T
(i.e., whenever t  1), and action selection occurs on each time t
for each trial T. Finally, QL (oL1, oL, s) denotes option value.
In keeping with established neural models of RL, we assume
that the action-selection mechanism is subserved by the basal
ganglia (e.g., Botvinick, Niv, et al., 2009; Niv, 2009), a heu-
ristic that we adopt because of long-standing precedent (e.g.,
Barto, 1995; Houk, Adams, & Barto, 1995). We view the
striatum’s role in the model as summarizing the behavior of a
complex network of neural systems that contribute to the pro-
duction of actions, including the parietal cortex, the cerebellum,
and the hippocampus. Further, in line with our previous pro-
posals that the primate ACC (in what has been termed, more
precisely, the anterior midcingulate cortex; Vogt, 2009) uses
RL signals to select between action policies (Holroyd & Coles,
2002), we assume that option selection and maintenance is
carried out by the ACC (Holroyd & Yeung, 2012). This pro-
posal is partly inspired by the work of Botvinick, Niv, et al.
(2009), who, considering possible neural mechanisms underly-
ing HRL in humans, suggested that the dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex (DLPFC) is responsible for option selection and main-
tenance. Our idea is isomorphic with their proposal, but instead
holds that option selection and maintenance is mediated by the
ACC rather than by the DLPFC, and aligns with the observation
that the rodent ACC codes for contextual, high-order rules that
specify individual task sets or strategies (Haddon & Killcross,
2006; Ma, Hyman, Lindsay, Phillips, & Seamans, 2014). The
theory thus proposes that the rodent ACC is concerned with the
selection and maintenance of each option—that is, with the task
itself—rather than with the details of task execution: By learn-
ing option values according to principles of RL, and by select-
ing options based on those learned values, the ACC decides
what task to perform and directs the basal ganglia to implement
the task.
Where in the brain is the metaoption level located? To elucidate
this question, we draw insight from the human neuroimaging
literature. Although previous theories of the human ACC have
posited that the rostral and caudal ACC subserve affective and
cognitive processing, respectively (Bush, Luu, & Posner, 2000),
recent observations have cast doubt on this suggestion (Shackman
et al., 2011). Rather, a growing body of evidence in humans
indicates that increasingly rostral parts of the frontal cortex imple-
ment increasingly higher levels of hierarchical abstraction (Badre
& D’Esposito, 2007, 2009; Badre & Frank, 2012; Collins, Ca-
vanagh, & Frank, 2014; Dixon, Fox, & Christoff, 2014; Jeon &
Friederici, 2013; Koechlin & Summerfield, 2007; Kouneiher,
Charron, & Koechlin, 2009; O’Reilly, 2010; Orr & Banich, 2014;
but see Crittenden & Duncan, 2014; Farooqui, Mitchell, Thomp-
son, & Duncan, 2012; Reynolds, O’Reilly, Cohen, & Braver,
2012). We thus assume that the metaoption level occurs in an area
of the rat medial frontal cortex rostral to the ACC. In rodents, a
candidate structure is the prelimbic cortex, a brain area said to be
anatomically related to the rostral ACC in primates (Seamans,
Lapish, & Durstewitz, 2008). These two suggestions—that the
frontal cortex is organized along a rostral–caudal hierarchy, and
that the medial frontal cortex is similarly hierarchically structured
in rats and humans—are controversial and therefore constitute
strong assumptions of the model. We return to these issues in the
Discussion section.
Note that each option represents a temporal abstraction of the
sequences of smaller actions that move the simulated rats within
each trial from various starting locations to distant end loca-
tions. Such temporal abstraction across collections of extended
behaviors constitutes a fundamental aspect of HRL (Botvinick,
Niv, et al., 2009). A related computational efficiency afforded
by HRL is the ability to sequence the options themselves for a
greater purpose. However, the experiments described here en-
tail rats engaging either in a single option repeatedly or in
switching between two options, but never in executing a suc-
cession of different options. Our emphasis on examining op-
tions in isolation is consistent with Botvinick, Niv, et al.’s
(2009) identification of options with task sets that, as noted
earlier, serve to represent sets of stimulus–response mappings.
For this reason, task sets provide a convenient entry to the
empirical study of option selection and maintenance. In this
way, the simulations— despite explicitly accounting for rat
behavior—speak to numerous primate studies that have exam-
ined ACC responses to task selection (Forstmann, Brass, Koch,
& von Cramon, 2006; Haynes et al., 2007), task initiation
(Murtha, Chertkow, Beauregard, Dixon, & Evans, 1996), task
switching (Boorman, Rushworth, & Behrens, 2013; Hayden,
Pearson, & Platt, 2011; Hikosaka & Isoda, 2010; Hyafil, Sum-
merfield, & Koechlin, 2009; Johnston, Levin, Koval, & Ever-
ling, 2007; Parris, Thai, Benattayallah, Summers, & Hodgson,
2007; Rushworth, Hadland, Paus, & Sipila, 2002) and task
maintenance and coordination (Aarts, Roelofs, & van
Turennout, 2008; M. X. Cohen, 2011; Dosenbach et al., 2006,
2007; Dosenbach, Fair, Cohen, Schlaggar, & Petersen, 2008;
Gevins, Smith, McEvoy, & Yu, 1997; Torta, Costa, Duca, Fox,
& Cauda, 2013; Womelsdorf, Johnston, Vinck, & Everling,
2010; Woodward, Ruff, & Ngan, 2006).
Control
Cognitive control refers to a collection of neurocognitive pro-
cesses concerned with the orchestration of complex behaviors,
especially when the appropriate course of action is undercon-
strained by information from the external environment, or when
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57HIERARCHICAL CONTROL OVER EFFORTFUL BEHAVIOR
the environment elicits automatic behaviors that are inconsistent
with task goals. The DLPFC, the ACC, and other regions of the
frontal cortex are thought to implement a diverse array of control
functions, including goal setting, planning, and performance mon-
itoring (E. K. Miller & Cohen, 2001; Stuss & Knight, 2002). One
important function is the ability to override habitual or impulsive
behaviors that are inappropriate for the task at hand. For example,
a driver must inhibit the impulse to accelerate at a green traffic
signal if the way is blocked by a road crew; and a dieter can
struggle against an overwhelming desire to finish a nearby package
of cookies. Such inner duels are a hallmark of human experience
and the subject of numerous two-system theories of behavioral
choice (Epstein, 1994; Fudenberg & Levine, 2006; Heatherton &
Wagner, 2011; Hofmann, Friese, & Strack, 2009; Kahneman,
2003; Sloman, 1996).
At the computational level, these observations suggest that the
mechanisms for action selection and option selection can be de-
coupled. Yet current HRL-inspired theories of neural function do
not include mechanisms for cognitive control. Rather, models of
choice based on RL have proposed either “flat” mechanisms that
continuously select between goal-driven and habit-driven neural
systems for action selection (Daw, Niv, & Dayan, 2005; Keramati,
Dezfouli, & Piray, 2011; Shah & Barto, 2009), or hierarchical
mechanisms in which the task specified by the higher level is
invariably executed faithfully by the lower level (Caluwaerts et al.,
2012; Dezfouli & Balleine, 2012, 2013). Other approaches provide
separate accounts of HRL (Ribas-Fernandes et al., 2011) and
effortful control (Shenhav et al., 2013). By contrast, our proposal
spans these literatures by presenting a hierarchical mechanism that
permits conflict between levels.
We propose that the ACC exerts control over the striatum to
prevent decoupling between the lower-level mechanism for action
selection and the higher level mechanism that maintains task
context as specified by the currently activated option. Our account
holds that the ACC not only chooses the option but also determines
the level of control to apply toward executing the option once
selected, while maintaining the option in working memory until
the option reaches its termination state. This proposal is supported
by evidence from both rat and primate studies (Baeg et al., 2003;
Dosenbach et al., 2008; Petit, Courtney, Ungerleider, & Haxby,
1998). When the selected option is associated with a high value
and control is necessary for successful task completion, then the
ACC exerts vigorous top-down control over the basal ganglia
(Cavanagh, Eisenberg, Guitart-Masip, Huys, & Frank, 2013), con-
sistent with an “energizing” function of the ACC inferred from rat
studies (Warden et al., 2012) and human clinical and neuroimaging
studies (M. P. Alexander, Stuss, Shallice, Picton, & Gillingham,
2005; Kouneiher et al., 2009; Picton, Stuss, Alexander, et al.,
2007; Picton, Stuss, Shallice, Alexander, & Gillingham, 2006;
Stuss et al., 2005). Conversely, when control is required but the
level of activation provided by the ACC to the basal ganglia is
weak, then subjects fail to maintain attention to the task at hand
(Passetti, Chudasama, & Robbins, 2002; Rushworth, Hadland,
Gaffan, & Passingham, 2003) and task performance is unsustain-
able (Amiez, Joseph, & Procyk, 2006; Camille, Tsuchida, & Fel-
lows, 2011; Kennerley, Walton, Behrens, Buckley, & Rushworth,
2006). This proposal is also supported by observations that ACC
activity is often inversely correlated with RTs (Mulert, Gallinat,
Dorn, Herrmann, & Winterer, 2003; Naito et al., 2000; Winterer,
Adams, Jones, & Knutson, 2002), and that ACC damage typically
results in longer and more variable RTs (M. P. Alexander et al.,
2005; Løvstad et al., 2012; Modirrousta & Fellows, 2008; Nac-
cache et al., 2005; Picton, Stuss, Alexander, et al., 2007; Picton,
Stuss, Shallice, et al., 2006; Stuss et al., 2005; Vendrell et al.,
1995) and higher false alarm rates (Tsuchida & Fellows, 2009).
We further propose that the influence of the prelimbic cortex over
option selection by the ACC comports to the same arrangement.
These option and metaoption control signals are implemented in
the model in the form of variables that minimize cost terms related
to action selection and option selection, respectively.
This architecture addresses the issue of action–option decou-
pling but invites an equally puzzling question: Why should the
system ever relinquish maximum control? In humans, control
famously waxes and wanes such that a diet can be obeyed one day
and not the next, yet we would never design a computer that “tried
hard” on some days but not on others. There would appear to be no
good reason for implementing a variable control signal at the
algorithmic level. As might be expected, then, the underlying
cause of control variability is highly controversial. A dominant
theory holds that the exertion of control utilizes a resource that
depletes with use, such that control is withdrawn when the re-
source on which it depends is depleted or is being husbanded for
future exploitation (Ackerman, 2011; Baumeister & Heatherton,
1996; Hagger, Wood, Stiff, & Chatzisarantis, 2010; van der Lin-
den, Frese, & Meijman, 2003). Consistent with this possibility,
application of top-down control is associated with an effortful cost
(Kool, McGuire, Wang, & Botvinick, 2013) that the system min-
imizes to a level just sufficient to sustain adequate task perfor-
mance (Kool, McGuire, Rosen, & Botvinick, 2010; Westbrook,
Kester, & Braver, 2013; Yeung & Monsell, 2003). But the intuitive
idea that control varies over time because it utilizes a limited
resource has been challenged by competing theories that instead
point to the opportunity costs of staying versus switching tasks
(Kurzban, Duckworth, Kable, & Myers, 2013) or to evolving task
priorities (Inzlicht & Schmeichel, 2012; Inzlicht, Schmeichel, &
Macrae, 2014). Although we favor resource-based accounts (Hol-
royd, 2013, 2014), our model is consistent with any theory that
proposes a relaxation of control for easy or automatic tasks (e.g.,
J. D. Cohen et al., 1990).
A third strong assumption of the model—in addition to the
assumptions that the frontal cortex is organized along a rostral–
caudal hierarchy, and that the medial frontal cortex is similarly
hierarchically structured in rats and humans—is that each of the
higher levels of the hierarchy control a cost term associated
with the selection process in their immediately lower levels.
Thus, the metaoption level controls a cost associated with
option selection by the option layer, and the option layer
controls a cost associated with action selection by the action
layer. These costs are assumed to derive from the effort entailed
in regulatory control over behavioral and cognitive processing
(Kool et al., 2013). In the case of actions, we propose that
action execution incurs a cost associated with the effortful
expenditure of physical energy, as suggested by observations
that people prefer to do nothing over something, even for
actions that exact only minimal energetic costs (Baumeister,
Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998; Brockner, Shaw, & Ru-
bin, 1979). Further, though not explicitly incorporated in the
model, these costs would also relate to the effort entailed in
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58 HOLROYD AND MCCLURE
overcoming physical pain. This idea was implemented in the
action selection algorithm as a bias against actions with high
energetic (or painful) costs that, in turn, could be attenuated by
an option-dependent control signal. The proposal aligns with
substantial evidence that the ACC in rats (e.g., Cowen, Davis,
& Nitz, 2012; Hauber & Sommer, 2009; Hillman & Bilkey,
2010, 2012; Walton, Bannerman, & Rushworth, 2002) and
primates (Botvinick, Huffstetler, & McGuire, 2009; Croxson,
Walton, O’Reilly, Behrens, & Rushworth, 2009; Davis, Hutchi-
son, Lozano, Tasker, & Dostrovsky, 2000; Kurniawan, Guitart-
Masip, Dayan, & Dolan, 2013; Mulert et al., 2008; Paus, Koski,
Caramanos, & Westbury, 1998; Prévost, Pessiglione, Metereau,
Clery-Melin, & Dreher, 2010) is differentially activated by
effortful costs and in response to painful stimuli (Dum,
Levinthal, & Strick, 2009; Johansen & Fields, 2004; Vogt &
Sikes, 2009). The idea is also consistent with evidence from rat
studies that ACC neurons provide a neural substrate for the
storage and expression of mental schemas that, like options,
map context and events onto appropriate actions (Euston, Gru-
ber, & McNaughton, 2012; S. H. Wang, Tse, & Morris, 2012),
providing long-term memories for control (Jung, Baeg, Kim,
Kim, & Kim, 2008).
What effortful cost is incurred by option selection? Sugges-
tively in this regard, Botvinick, Niv, et al. (2009) observed that
the concepts of task sets in cognitive psychology and options in
HRL share important commonalities, namely, that both ideas
postulate a unitary representation that (1) can be selected or
activated; (2) remains active for some period of time following its
initial selection; (3) leads to the imposition of a specific stimulus-
response mapping or policy; and (4) can participate in hierarchical
relations with other representations of the same kind.
These considerations indicate that task sets constitute a par-
ticular type of high-level option. Further, it is commonly ob-
served in humans that switching between two different tasks
results in longer RTs and higher error rates compared with
repeating the same task (Kiesel et al., 2010; Monsell, 2003).
Given the proposed correspondence between task sets and op-
tions, it follows that switching between options exacts a switch
cost. Importantly, in humans, overcoming this switch cost is
effortful (Kool et al., 2013) and aversive (Dreisbach & Fischer,
2012), resulting in a bias for sticking with the same option in
order to minimize the cost (Botvinick, 2007; Kool et al., 2010).
Further, switch costs are normally larger for easier (faster and
more accurate) options than for harder (slower and less accu-
rate) options (Allport, Styles, & Hsieh, 1994), especially when
the options share characteristics that invite cross-talk (Yeung &
Monsell, 2003). Remarkably, this asymmetrical switch cost is
large enough to inhibit participants from switching away from
the harder option to the easier option, despite the higher de-
mands of the harder task (Millington, Poljac, & Yeung, 2013;
Yeung, 2010). In the model, we assume that rat behavior is
similarly constrained by a switch cost, as observed in humans,
which is implemented as a cost in the option-selection algo-
rithm that penalizes switches and that is modulated by a control
signal applied from the metaoption level.
We implemented these ideas as follows. QL(oL1,oL,s) de-
notes the value of state-option pair (o,s) at level L specific to the
option selected at level L  1. This value can be separated into
two terms:
QL(oL1, oL, s)VL(oL1, oL, s)
CL(oL, s)
1 εL1
(2)
where VL(oL1, oL, s) is the value of state-option pair (o, s) at level
L specific to the option selected at level L  1, as determined by
the learning algorithm for that level, CL is the level-dependent cost
for executing option oL in state s (CL  0), and εL1 is a “control”
variable determined by the immediately higher level L  1. Note
that for L  1 and a given option oL1, V constitutes a 5  11 
11 array corresponding to the values of the five actions available
at each cell within the 11  11 gridworld. For L  2, V constitutes
a two-element array corresponding to the value of two available
behavioral tasks (e.g., response vs. place; see Cross-Maze Task
simulation); and for L  3, V constitutes a scalar variable denoting
the value of the experiment itself. For L  3, L, εL1, and oL1
are not defined, as the model allows for only one metaoption and
the probability of selecting this metaoption is always 1.0. This
equation indicates that high levels of control from the metaoption
and option levels attenuate the costs of selecting options or actions
in the levels that they control, which vanish in the limit. Con-
versely, the absence of control results in maximum exposure to the
cost of option and action selection, which biases the system against
selecting these possibilities.
Finally, in addition to the action- and option-selection costs
described thus far, we assume that maintaining an option (or
metaoption) in working memory over the course of a trial exerts an
effortful cost that, all other things being equal, results in reduced
control over time. The decay of control is implemented in an
update rule (discussed later).
Reinforcement
The HRL theory of the ACC integrates concepts of hierarchy
and control with reinforcement (Holroyd & Yeung, 2012). The
involvement of the ACC in RL and reward processing is well
known in primate studies and discussed elsewhere (e.g., Amiez,
Joseph, & Procyk, 2005; Cai & Padoa-Schioppa, 2012; Hayden &
Platt, 2010; Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Holroyd & Yeung, 2011;
Kennerley, Behrens, & Wallis, 2011; Luk & Wallis, 2009; Matsu-
moto, Matsumoto, Abe, & Tanaka, 2007; Sallet et al., 2007;
Shidara & Richmond, 2002; Shima & Tanji, 1998; Walsh &
Anderson, 2012). In the model, reinforcement exerts two primary
effects. First, the reinforcement determines values for action and
option selection according to learning algorithms that are specific
to each level of the hierarchy. At the lower level, action selection
operates according to standard principles of RL such that the
animal learns the value of actions available in different states of
the world (Sutton & Barto, 1998; see Figure 1). Values are learned
progressively from reward prediction error signals that indicate
when events are better or worse than expected. Current thinking
holds that the reward prediction errors are encoded as phasic
increases and decreases in the firing rate of midbrain dopamine
neurons (Schultz, 2013), which are utilized by the striatum for the
purpose of adaptive decision making (M. X. Cohen & Frank, 2009;
Montague, Hyman, & Cohen, 2004), although it is likely that value
learning is subserved by the striatum in conjunction with other
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59HIERARCHICAL CONTROL OVER EFFORTFUL BEHAVIOR
neural systems to which the striatum interconnects (Haber &
Knutson, 2010).
To be specific, learning of action values (V) follows principles
of flat RL. For L  1, V is learned according to the SARSA
(State-Action-Reward-State-Action) update rule (Sutton & Barto,
1998)
VL1,t1(oL2, a, s)¢VL1,t1(oL2, a, s)t (3)
where (a, s) is the state–action pair occurring at time step t–1; oL2
specifies the 11  11  5 array of state-action values specific to
the option selected at level L  2;  is the learning rate (0   
1); and the subscript t is provided for clarity. Further, 	t= is the
temporal difference error at time t, as given by
t rt	VL1,t(oL2, a, s)VL1,t1(oL2, a, s) (4)
and
t  t, if t 0t
, if t 0 (5)
where (a’, s’) is the state–action pair occurring at time step t; rt is
the “primary” reward encountered at time t (r  0); 
 is the
discount parameter (0  
  1) (Sutton & Barto, 1998); and  is
a constant (0  1). VL1,t is defined as zero for terminal states.
Note that Equation 5 introduces an asymmetry between the
strength of negative and positive temporal difference errors that
effectively reduces the impact of negative temporal difference
errors relative to positive temporal difference errors because   1
(see, e.g., Frank, Moustafa, Haughey, Curran, & Hutchison, 2007),
resulting in slowed reversal learning.
At the next level of the motor control hierarchy, the ACC is
hypothesized to learn the value of option execution and to apply
top-down control over the striatum in line with the value of the
current task. Likewise, the prelimbic cortex is hypothesized to
learn the value of the metaoption and to apply top-down control
over the ACC in line with the experiment itself. This proposal
holds that the ACC (or the prelimbic cortex) associates each option
(or metaoption) with the average reward received across trials
during the execution of that option (or metaoption). Such learning
may be mediated by tonic dopamine levels, the impact of which on
medial frontal cortex function has been well explored in rats. A
wealth of evidence indicates that tonic dopamine levels strongly
modulate the working memory functions of the medial frontal
cortex (Floresco & Magyar, 2006; Seamans & Yang, 2004). Tonic
dopamine levels have been proposed to code for average reward
rate (Niv, 2007; see also Beierholm et al., 2013), which appears to
facilitate the decision-making functions of the medial frontal cor-
tex (Floresco, 2013). Consistent with this idea, reward-related
dopamine release in the medial frontal cortex is critical to the
acquisition of novel goal-directed behavioral strategies (i.e., op-
tions; Stark, Rothe, Wagner, & Scheich, 2004; Stefani & Moghad-
dam, 2006), and depends on the relative amount of work required
to get the reward (Richardson & Gratton, 1998). Both D1 and D2
receptors in the prefrontal cortex also contribute to the formation
of long-term memories (Blond, Crépel, & Otani, 2002; Puig &
Miller, 2012; Sheynikhovich, Otani, & Arleo, 2011; Xu et al.,
2009; Young & Yang, 2005), as well as to rapid updates of
network connectivity (Arnsten, Paspalas, Gamo, Yang, & Wang,
2010), perhaps providing the means for the ACC to learn option
values.
Accordingly, option values V for levels L  2,3 are determined
by the average reward received across trials while that option is
selected, updated at the end of each trial according to
VL2,3(oL)¢ R (1)VL2,3(oL) (6)
where R is the total reward received on that trial and  is a constant
that determines the average reward learning rate (0   1). State
notation is removed for convenience, as the update rule is applied
at trial completion independently of the specific state s. Note that
oL corresponds to one of two available options for level L  2
(e.g., response vs. place in Cross-Maze simulation) and to only one
metaoption for level L  3 (i.e., engage in task or not). Effectively,
Level 2 of the hierarchy maintains separate average reward values
for each option, whereas Level 3 of the hierarchy maintains the
average reward value across options.
This proposal holds that the ACC (or prelimbic cortex) associ-
ates each option (or metaoption) with the average reward received
across trials during the execution of that option (or metaoption) to
learn about task (or experiment) value rather than about action (or
option) values. The idea dovetails with evidence in rats (Sul, Kim,
Huh, Lee, & Jung, 2010), as well as in primates (Amiez et al.,
2006; Holroyd & Coles, 2008; Kennerley et al., 2006; Seo & Lee,
2007), that the ACC is concerned with integrating reward values
across multiple trials rather than in instigating trial-to-trial adjust-
ments in behavior.
The second effect of reinforcement is to adjust the level of
control applied by each level over its immediately lower level. In
the model, the ACC and the prelimbic cortex rely on a reward-
dependent feedback loop to determine the minimal amount of
control needed to maintain high average reward: Top-down control
increases when received rewards are worse than expected and
decreases otherwise (as observed in a study with human partici-
pants; Venables & Fairclough, 2009). In this way, the ACC and the
prelimbic cortex relax regulatory control when events unfold
smoothly and boost control when they do not, with a stable
equilibrium point at minimum control required to maximize re-
ward.
To be specific, for levels L  2,3, the control term εL in
Equation 2 is initialized at the start of each block of trials with
value εmax (0) and updated at the end of each trial according to
the prediction error L as
LRVL2,3(oL)
εL¢εL, 0MAX, if L 0εL, εmaxMIN, if L 0 (7)
where  and ’ are constants (’    0). This formulation
ensures that the control for level L decreases linearly to zero when
the total reward received on a given trial is equal to or exceeds the
average reward associated with the option in play at that level, and
increases linearly to a maximum of εmax otherwise. For L  1, εL
is undefined (as the bottom level cannot apply control over a still
lower level, although it may be plausible that the striatum may
differentially regulate motor cortex activity based on expected
reward).
Maximal control thus begins afresh at the start of each block
of trials. For a novel task, this refresh enables the system to
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60 HOLROYD AND MCCLURE
explore the problem space and determine the maximum average
amount of reward that it can expect to receive. If the organism
continues to achieve the expected reward, then control is grad-
ually disengaged. However, if received rewards are less than
expected, then control is reinstated. In this way, effortful con-
trol over goal-directed behavior is recruited only when success-
ful task performance is necessary for high payoff. These fea-
tures are supported by observations that neuronal activity in the
rat ACC begins each experimental session high (Hillman &
Bilkey, 2012), and then decays to the minimal threshold nec-
essary to sustain adequate task performance (Hillman & Bilkey,
2010), suggesting that the ACC is responsible for “staying the
course” toward achieving long-term goals (Hillman & Bilkey,
2013; Williams, Mohler, & Givens, 1999). In humans, this
formulation likewise resonates with observations that ACC
activity is responsible for task persistence in the face of adver-
sity (Kurniawan et al., 2010; Parvizi et al., 2013), especially
when ongoing performance is predictive of high payoff (Dixon
& Christoff, 2012; Shenhav et al., 2013).
Simulation Details
We conducted seven sets of simulations associated with four
tasks, conducted across 13 experiments in five studies. For each
experiment, simulated performance data were averaged across
groups of 100 subjects separately for the sham and lesion condi-
tions. Each experiment consisted of an initial habituation phase
during which option selection was equiprobable (produced by
setting L  1,000), followed by a subsequent training phase and
the experiment proper. The experiments were characterized by
separate blocks of trials, the number of which depended on the
specifics of each experiment. For each subject, values VL(oL1, oL,
s) for option-specific actions (L  1), and VL(oL) for options (L 
2) and for the metaoption (L  3), were initialized at zero at the
start of each experiment. Further, the control signals εL for levels
L  2,3 were reinitialized at the start of each block of trials as εL 
εmax.
Table 1 lists the parameter values across the seven sets of
simulations. The parameter values were determined using evolu-
tionary optimization techniques (Ashlock, 2010) that minimized
the sum of squared errors between simulated and empirical behav-
ior. Because of the high computational demands of the simula-
tions, these parameters were optimized, at most, four at a time.
This approach necessitated fixing some parameters at reason-
able—though, by necessity, somewhat arbitrary—values when op-
timizing over other parameters. In particular, values for , εmax, ,
and = were all set by fiat (= was fixed across studies as a multiple
of ), whereas the optimization procedure centered on obtaining
values for , 
, 1, 2, and . To the extent possible, the same
parameter values were utilized across all of the experiments. It was
not possible to find a single set of values that accounted for the two
cross-maze experiments as well as the two barrier maze and their
related experiments (delay maze and water maze). Thus, , , 1,
and  differed across these two sets of simulations. Further,  (and
=) was increased for the tonic dopamine-related simulations. Note
that the task demands of the cross-maze and the barrier maze tasks
are quite different from one another—which is why the tasks were,
in fact, selected for simulation—so it is unsurprising that some
simulation parameters differed between experiments.
Results
Cross-Maze Task
Our first goal was to illustrate the essential role of the rat medial
frontal cortex over hierarchical behavior. To do so, we simulated
performance of rodents on a cross-maze task in which two super-
ordinate task goals—appropriate for the “place” and “response”
conditions of the experiment—were alternately required for suc-
cessful performance (Ragozzino, Detrick, & Kesner, 1999). On
each trial in the place condition, animals were started from either
of two arm locations of the cross-maze and were required to find
a reward located in a third arm that remained fixed across trials,
that is, always in the north arm, irrespective of whether the rat
started from the south or west arms. By contrast, on each trial of
a response condition of the task, the animals were required to turn
in a particular direction from the start arms with respect to their
egocentric frame of reference, that is, to turn right, irrespective of
whether they started from the west and east arms (see Figure 2).
Rats were first trained on one task condition and were then
retrained on the other task condition. Temporary inactivation of the
prelimbic cortex was accomplished by infusion of a calcium chan-
nel blocker. When this lesion was imposed as rats learned the
second task, it was observed to retard learning in treatment animals
relative to sham controls, regardless of which task was learned first
(Figure 3, top left, A vs. B). However, if the drug was administered
as animals learned the first task condition, then it had no effect on
Table 1
Parameter Values for Each Experiment
 
  1 2  εmax  =
Barrier 0.8 0.92 1.0 0.7 0.18 .67 6.0 .5 1.0
BarRev 0.8 0.92 1.0 0.7 0.18 .67 6.0 .5 1.0
Delay 0.8 0.92 1.0 0.7 0.18 .67 6.0 .5 1.0
BarDop 0.8 0.92 1.0 0.7 0.18 .67 6.0 .9 1.8
Water 0.8 0.92 1.0 0.7 0.18 .67 15.0 .5 1.0
Cross 0.2 0.92 .5 0.2 0.18 .96 6.0 .5 1.0
CrossDop 0.2 0.92 .5 0.2 0.18 .96 6.0 1.2 2.4
Note. Rows  experiments; columns  parameters. Barrier  barrier maze task; BarRev  barrier maze task
with reversal; Delay  delay maze task; BarDop  barrier maze with ACC dopamine disruption; Water  water
maze task; Cross  cross-maze task; CrossDop  cross-maze task with prelimbic dopamine disruption.
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61HIERARCHICAL CONTROL OVER EFFORTFUL BEHAVIOR
performance when learning the second task (Figure 3, top left, A
vs. C; Ragozzino et al., 1999). The impaired ability to shift to the
new task strategy resulted from a tendency to perseverate on
behaviors learned during the first task condition (Figure 3, middle
left), and was selective for shifts to a new task. In particular, the
temporary prelimbic lesions had no impact on reversal learning
within a given task (Figure 3, bottom left): Lesioned rats were
capable of relearning, but were selectively impaired in switching
task goals (i.e., switching between actions determined by place or
response).
Figure 1 illustrates the model design. On each trial, the ACC
selected either an option for executing the task according to a
place strategy, or an option for executing the task according to
a response strategy (see also Caluwaerts et al., 2012, for a
similar model). The striatum learned to navigate individual
steps of the maze on the basis of separate sets of option-specific
state-action values (one set for each of the place and response
options), supported by top-down control from the ACC. The
ACC selected between the options by weighting their learned
average reward values against an assumed cost of switching
from one task to the other, which biased the ACC to favor
continued selection of the same option. Meanwhile, whereas the
ACC learned the average reward value of each option sepa-
rately, the prelimbic cortex learned the average reward of the
experiment itself, across options. The prelimbic cortex then
applied a top-down control signal over ACC activity to over-
come the switch cost to facilitate switching between options.
The degree of top-down control was minimized by a feedback
control loop that increased control when the received rewards
were worse than average and decreased control otherwise.
We simulated performance on Experiments 1 through 4 of
Ragozzino and colleagues (1999); trial sequences and maze
specifics (e.g., reward magnitude for each trial) are described in
the methods section of that article. The cross-maze was repre-
sented as a central cell from which four alleys of five cells
radiated outward in each of the cardinal directions (Figure 4a).
Possible start and end locations are indicated in Figure 4a by Xs,
which varied from trial to trial depending on the experiment and
condition, as detailed in Ragozzino and colleagues (1999). Only
two possible alley choices were available to the agent on a
given trial (Ragozzino et al., 1999); Figure 2 provides example
maze configurations for the different conditions. Optimal per-
formance across conditions depended on use of both place and
response strategies, so nL2  2 (Equation 1), yielding two
separate sets of 11  11  5 option-specific actions values. On
trials in which the agent selected the “response” option, the
gridworld coordinates were rotated into an egocentric reference
frame (simplified by fixing the start location in the south alley
irrespective of the actual start location of the agent). A switch
cost was incurred when the agent evaluated switching to the
different option (CL2  1.0, Equation 2), except for the first
trial in each block of trials when there was no immediately prior
trial from which to switch (CL2  0). Reward values were r 
1.5 for every half-pellet of food found at the reward locations.
The effect of prelimbic lesions on performance was simulated
by setting εL3  0.
This instantiation of the HRL theory accounts for the im-
paired switching observed following prelimbic lesions, as fol-
lows (Figure 3, right column). The prelimbic cortex averages
the reward received across the entire experiment and applies
increased top-down control to the ACC whenever this value
decreases, as occurs following the task shift when error rates
increase. In turn, this additional prelimbic control reduces the
impact of the switch cost in the ACC option selection, which
would otherwise lead to response perseveration associated with
the first option strategy. Lesions to the prelimbic cortex remove
this source of top-down control, resulting in impaired switching
during the shift phase (Figure 3, top right) because of increased
perseverations (Figure 3, middle right). By contrast, simulated
prelimbic lesions spare reversal learning because the new re-
sponse mappings are consistent with the superordinate goal
associated with the previous option selected and maintained by
the ACC (Figure 3, bottom right). In this case, choosing to go
Figure 2. Example maze configurations for the place and response con-
ditions of the cross-maze task. In the place condition (top), the agent starts
each trial at location s in either the west or south arms and the reward
occurs at location r in the north arm; irrespective of starting location, the
east arm is blocked. In the response condition (bottom), the agent starts
each trial at location s in either the west or east arms and the reward occurs
at locations r, that is, at the end of the right arm relative to the starting
location; irrespective of starting location, the forward arm is blocked.
Arrow indicates north for all trial types across both place and response
conditions.
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62 HOLROYD AND MCCLURE
Figure 3. Empirical and simulated data of rats engaged in the cross-maze task. Rats were trained initially on
either the place task (solid lines) or the response task (dotted lines). Empirical data are shown in the left column
and simulated data are shown in the right column. Top panels: Number of trials to reach learning criterion when
shifting to the new task. Middle panels: Number of perseverations on the previous task when shifting to the new
task. Bottom panels: Number of trials to reach criterion when learning the reverse stimulus–response mappings
associated with the first task condition. The abscissa indicates treatment condition. A  sham group; B 
treatment group in which prelimbic cortex is inactivated during the second task condition; C  treatment group
in which prelimbic cortex is inactivated during the first task condition. Error bars indicate standard error of the
mean. Empirical data from Ragozzino and colleagues (1999); all data correspond to the second task condition
of each experiment, that is, to the shift condition in the shift experiments and to the reversal condition in the
reversal experiments. Prelimbic cortex lesions are simulated by setting the control value for the metaoption to
zero.
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63HIERARCHICAL CONTROL OVER EFFORTFUL BEHAVIOR
left instead of right, or north instead of east, requires learning
new state-action values for the same “response” or “place”
option, respectively. Unlike the switch condition, in which an
increase in perseverative errors occurs following the switch
from the previous (incorrect) task, in the reversal condition,
perseverative errors are avoided because new state-action val-
ues are learned for the previous (correct) task.
The theory thus proposes a division of labor between prelim-
bic and ACC mechanisms for behavioral regulation. At one
level of control, the ACC selects options for execution that have
high expected value relative to the cost in switching between
options. At a higher level, the prelimbic cortex learns the value
of the metaoption as a whole and applies top-down control over
the ACC that facilitates option selection. This organization
ensures successful completion of the high-level system goal by
enabling exploration over tasks: When the ACC selects an
option that fails to meet the objective of its parent metaoption
in the prelimbic cortex, then the prelimbic cortex commands the
ACC to try out alternative options that might better achieve its
objective.
Finally, we explored the consequences of disruption of tonic
dopamine levels in the prelimbic cortex. Because we assumed
that this dopamine activity is encoded as the average reward
value of the metaoption, we set this variable to zero (the decay
rate  was also increased for both the sham and lesion simula-
tions). Figure 5 (left column) illustrates the results of an em-
pirical study in which rats in the cross-maze experiment were
given a dopamine D1 antagonist (Ragozzino, 2002). Simulated
performance on this task when the average reward value of the
metaoption is set to zero is also shown (Figure 5, right column).
As can be seen by inspection, capping this variable at a low
value qualitatively reproduces the consequences of dopamine
disruption in the prelimbic cortex, which, in turn, mirrors the
effects of direct lesions to the prelimbic cortex itself (see Figure
3). In the model, artificially reducing the value of the metaop-
tion causes the received rewards to be continually better than
Figure 4. Simulation gridworlds. (a) Cross-maze (Ragozzino et al., 1999): X indicates possible start and reward
locations that varied from trial to trial, as detailed in Ragozzino and colleagues (1999); only two alleys choices
were available to the agent on a given trial. (b) Barrier maze (Walton et al., 2002): r1 and r2 denote reward
amounts and associated locations for the left and right alleys, respectively; b1 and b2 denote barrier heights and
associated locations for the left and right alleys, respectively; s indicates the start location at the stem of the maze.
(c) Water maze: s and r indicate start and reward locations, respectively; moving in any direction in the maze
incurred a small energetic cost. (d) Delay maze (Rudebeck et al., 2006): r1 and r2 denote reward amounts and
associated locations for the left and right alleys, respectively; d1 and d2 denote delay lengths for the left and right
alleys, respectively; s indicates the start location at the stem of the maze.
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64 HOLROYD AND MCCLURE
Figure 5. Empirical (left column) and simulated (right column) effects of dopamine disruption in the prelimbic
cortex on cross-maze task performance. Data correspond to the second (shift) condition of each experiment; rats
were trained on the place task and shifted to the response task (solid lines), or were trained on the response task
and shifted to the place task (dotted lines). Empirical data associated with dopamine system disruption are shown
in the left column and simulated data are shown in the right column. Top panels: number of trials to reach
learning criterion when shifting to the new task. Bottom panels: number of perseverations on the previous task
when shifting to the new task. The abscissa indicates treatment condition. A  sham group; B  treatment group
in which the prelimbic cortex was infused with a dopamine D1 antagonist, SCH23390, during the second task
condition; C  Treatment group in which the prelimbic cortex was infused with SCH23390 during the first task
condition. Error bars indicate standard error of the mean. Empirical data from Ragozzino (2002). Note that the
tasks in Ragozzino (2002) and Ragozzino and colleagues (1999) are characterized by minor methodological
differences, and task performance was simulated using the maze design described in Ragozzino and colleagues
(1999). Reduced dopamine levels in the prelimbic cortex were simulated by setting the average reward value for
the metaoption to zero.
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65HIERARCHICAL CONTROL OVER EFFORTFUL BEHAVIOR
the (incorrectly low) average, which allows control over task
selection to dissipate even when control is needed (Equation 7).
Barrier Maze Task
Our second goal was to demonstrate that the ACC implements
the same hierarchical principles as the prelimbic cortex, with the
only difference being the nature of the controlled signal: Whereas
the prelimbic cortex controls the switch costs associated with
option selection by the ACC, the ACC controls the effort-related
costs associated with action selection by the striatum. To do so, we
simulated the results of an influential study on rodents that dem-
onstrated the essential role of the ACC in motivating effortful
behavior (Walton et al., 2002). Rats in the experiment were re-
quired to navigate a “barrier maze” for reward. On each trial of the
experiment, the rats were presented with a decision to either climb
a barrier to receive a high reward in one arm of a T maze—
incurring a large energetic cost—or to obtain an unobstructed but
low reward in the other maze arm. As revealed in Figure 6 (solid
lines), in Condition A (white background), the rats initially pre-
ferred to climb over the large barrier to receive the high reward.
However, following surgery after Block 6, rats with ACC lesions
eschewed the high-reward arm in favor of the low-reward arm
(thick solid line). When an additional barrier was placed in the
low-reward arm (Condition B, gray background), these rats
again preferred the high-reward arm, demonstrating continued
sensitivity to reward values when energetic costs were equated
across choices. Subsequently, in Condition C (dotted back-
ground), the barrier in the high-reward arm was reduced in
height, attracting the rats to that arm with increased probability.
Finally, when the difference in the reward value between the
two arms was increased from 4:2 pellets (Conditions A to C) to
5:1 pellets (Condition D, hatched background), preference for
the high-reward arm also increased. By contrast, the sham-
lesioned rats (thin solid line) chose the high-reward arm
throughout all of the experimental conditions.
We simulated performance on Experiments 1 through 4 of the
study by Walton and colleagues (2002). Trial sequences and maze
specifics (e.g., reward magnitude and barrier height for each con-
dition) are described in the methods section of that article. The T
maze was represented within an 11  11 gridworld as a stem
consisting of six cells with two alleys, five cells each, radiating
perpendicularly from the stem end (Figure 4b). Rewards (r) were
delivered at the end of each alley, in which r  1.5 for each pellet
of food. Barrier placement in each alley was associated with the
unit immediately adjacent to the maze junction (Figure 4b), rep-
resented as a penalty CL1  4.5 for 30-cm barriers when the
agent evaluated entering that cell (Equation 2). Values of r and
CL  1 were scaled linearly for different reward amounts and
barrier heights, respectively (e.g., r  3 for two pellets of food).
The effect of ACC lesions on performance were simulated by
setting εL2  0—that is, fixing the ACC control signal over
striatal action selection to zero. Note that there is no equivalent to
the option-level choice in the T maze as in the cross-maze task
previously (i.e., place vs. response options). We therefore set
nL2  1 (Equation 1) and CL2  0 (Equation 2), yielding a
single 11  11  5 set of option-specific primitive action values.
The model accounts for the effects of ACC damage in terms of
the relative values associated with task execution at different levels
of abstraction. Action selection in the model is driven by the
striatum, which weights the immediate costs of executing actions
against their predicted benefits. By itself, we assume that this
cost–benefit comparison produces a strong preference for low
rewards that are easily obtained over high rewards that demand a
large energetic investment (Condition A, white background). ACC
lesions expose these preferences (simulated in the model by setting
the control term to zero; thick dotted line following ACC ablation).
Of course, when the costs of the two choices are equated (Condi-
tion B, gray background), the size of the barrier is reduced (Con-
dition C, dotted background), or the reward differential between
arms is increased (Condition D, hatched background), the cost–
benefit analysis performed by the striatum tilts in favor of the
high-reward arm. By contrast, when functioning normally, the
ACC learns the average reward value associated with task execu-
tion as a whole and applies top-down control over the striatum as
necessary to maintain the higher reward rate associated with the
larger reward. We model this by assuming that the ACC begins
each session with sufficient top-down control to the striatum to
overcome the energetic cost of climbing over the barrier, propel-
Figure 6. Empirical (solid lines) and simulated (dotted lines) data of rats
engaged in the barrier maze task (Walton et al., 2002). Across all condi-
tions, rats choose between one arm containing a high reward (HR) and a
second arm containing a low reward (LR). In Condition A (white back-
ground), the HR arm is obstructed by a large barrier and the LR arm is
unobstructed. In Condition B (gray background), both arms are obstructed
by large barriers. In Condition C (dotted background), the HR arm is
obstructed by a medium-size barrier and the LR arm is unobstructed. In
Condition D (hatched background), the differential value between the HR
and LR arms is increased. Ordinate indicates percent of trials in which rats
select the HR arm. Abscissa indicates condition, where performance data
for each condition are averaged according to blocks of 10 trials each. E.
sham  empirical results for sham-lesioned animals; E. lesion  empirical
results for animals with anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) lesions; S. sham 
simulated results for sham lesioned animals; S. lesion  simulated results
for animals with ACC lesions. Note that ACC lesions were induced during
Condition A following the first six blocks of trials as indicated by the
arrow, which was simulated in the model by setting the ACC control term
to zero. Empirical data from Walton et al. (2002).
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66 HOLROYD AND MCCLURE
ling the system to obtain the high reward (thin dotted line). The
minimum level of top-down control necessary to maximize overall
reward is then automatically determined by a feedback control
loop: Control decays while average reward remains high, enabling
the striatum to explore the low-reward arm, but the resulting
decrease in the average reward precipitates increased control by
the ACC, which returns the system to a state of effortful but more
rewarding activity.
In parallel to our analysis of the cross-maze experiment, we also
considered the effect of simulated disruption to tonic dopamine
levels in the ACC. To do so, we set the average reward value of the
selected option to zero (the decay rate  was also increased for
both the sham and lesion simulations). As can be seen in Figure 7,
physical disruption of dopamine levels in the ACC by local appli-
cation of 6-hydroxydopamine impairs performance on the task in
a manner similar to direct ablation of the ACC (Schweimer, Saft &
Hauber, 2005). Further, artificially reducing the value of the se-
lected option in the simulation produces a comparable effect. This
result obtains because all of the received rewards are then better
than the (incorrectly low) model-estimated average reward, per-
mitting control levels to plummet (Equation 7).
The barrier maze results are commonly interpreted to mean that
the ACC is responsible for enabling the animal to work for reward
(Walton et al., 2002). Our results instead point toward a more
nuanced explanation (see also Walton, Rudebeck, Bannerman, &
Rushworth, 2007): The ACC encodes a course of action at the
level of task representation and applies sufficient control to ensure
its successful completion. Without the ACC’s input based on the
higher level value of performing the task, action selection is
dominated by simple actions mediated by the basal ganglia that are
reflexive, effort-averse, and characterized by immediate gratifica-
tion.
Critically, the ACC facilitates exploration of actions within a
task in parallel to how the prelimbic cortex facilitates the explo-
ration of task strategies within the experiment. To illustrate this
point, we simulated a novel, reversal learning condition of the
barrier maze task. The simulation details and parameter values
were identical to Condition B of the barrier maze task, in which
both arms were blocked by high barriers (as described earlier;
Figure 6), except that the high-reward arm contained seven pellets
and the low-reward arm contained zero pellets (instead of 4:2).
Following an initial exploration phase with no barriers, the rats
engaged in 20 trials of the barrier maze task (high reward in Arm
1 and no reward in Arm 2, both arms blocked), after which the
reward location was suddenly switched to the other arm (no reward
in Arm 1 and high reward in Arm 2, both arms blocked). As
before, ACC lesions were simulated by setting the control term for
the option to zero.
Figure 8 illustrates the model predictions before and after the
reversal. Prior to the reversal (top panel), the model reproduces the
results seen previously in Condition B of the barrier maze task
(see Figure 6): When barriers are placed in front of both arms, both
the simulated animals with sham lesions and the animals with
ACC lesions prefer the high-reward arm (Arm 1) almost exclu-
sively. As before, the lesion group chooses the high-reward arm
despite the cost incurred by the barrier for two reasons: first,
because the costs between the two choices are equated (Figure 6,
Condition B), and second, because the reward values between the
arms are skewed to relatively extreme values (Figure 6, Condition
D), rendering the choice for the high-reward arm particularly
obvious. By contrast, the two groups exhibit qualitatively different
behaviors after the reversal (Figure 8, middle panel). When the
high reward is suddenly moved to Arm 2, the simulated control
rats shift their preference to that arm. However, instead of choos-
ing one arm over the other, the rats with ACC lesions hesitate and
choose neither—even though they are entirely capable of climbing
over the barriers, which they readily surmounted before the switch.
Insight into this dissociation is provided by the simulated con-
trol levels (Figure 8, bottom panel). Before the reversal, the ani-
mals with ACC lesions climb the barrier in Arm 1 to get the high
reward, which is achieved on the basis of the striatal efforts alone.
Following the reversal, they quickly learn that Arm 1 no longer
contains the reward, but without the support from the ACC are
unmotivated to explore Arm 2, which they remember as being
empty. So the rats with ACC lesions choose neither alternative. By
contrast, the sham-lesioned animals also climb the barrier in Arm
1 to get the reward before the reversal, and because the striatum
can satisfactorily perform this task on its own, the control level in
the sham group gradually decays to zero. But following the rever-
sal, the sudden absence of rewards in Arm 1 precipitates a spike in
Figure 7. Empirical (solid lines) and simulated (dotted lines) effects on
barrier maze performance of reduced dopamine levels in the anterior
cingulate cortex (ACC) as reported in Schweimer and colleagues (2005).
Across all blocks, one arm of the T maze contained a high reward (HR) and
the other arm contained a low reward. Ordinate indicates percent of trials
that subjects chose the HR arm; abscissa indicates block. Block A (white
background) corresponds to trials in which the HR arm was obstructed with
a high barrier, and Block B corresponds to trials in which both arms were
obstructed with high barriers. Dopamine processing was disrupted locally
in the ACC by application of 6-hydroxydopamine (6-OHDA) neurotoxin at
the time indicated by the arrow. This effect was simulated by setting the
value for the selected option to zero. E. sham  empirical results for
sham-lesioned animals; E. lesion  empirical results for animals with
6-OHDA ACC lesions; S. sham  simulated results for sham-lesioned
animals; S. lesion  simulated results for animals with 6-OHDA ACC
lesions.
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67HIERARCHICAL CONTROL OVER EFFORTFUL BEHAVIOR
control that motivates the striatum to explore Arm 2. Once the
striatum finds the new reward location and learns the new set of
action–reward contingencies, the ACC again gradually withdraws
control. The sham group succeeds where the lesioned group fails
because the ACC has come to associate the task itself with a high
reward value. When that high expectation is not met, the ACC, in
effect, assumes that the problem must have an alternative solu-
tion—and is willing to put the work in to find it. By contrast,
without knowledge of the higher context in which the rewards are
delivered, the striatum assumes the truth of what it has learned:
that neither of the arms contains any reward.
Water Maze Task
The pseudoparalysis of the rats with ACC lesions in the barrier
maze simulation points to the source of akinetic mutism, which we
highlight here by simulating rat performance on an additional,
imagined test. The simulated rats were required to move to a small,
distant reward in a “water maze” that was implemented as an 11 
11 gridworld, as illustrated in Figure 4c. The agent started each
trial at location s and was required to find a reward (r  6) located
cater-cornered in the maze. The maze exacted an effort penalty,
CL1  .5, for all actions except sitting (i.e., move north, south,
east, or west), and CL1  0 for sitting. The experiment consisted
of a three-block habituation phase (1, 2  1000), followed by 12
blocks of 10 trials each for the experiment proper. The ACC was
lesioned by setting the option-level control signal to zero (εL2 
0). Results are illustrated in Figure 9. Under the assumption that all
movements through the maze exact small energetic costs, simu-
lated ACC lesions reduced the number of trials that the rat suc-
cessfully obtained the reward because of an increased propensity
to sit.
Figure 8. Simulated performance on the barrier maze reversal task. Top
panel: Percent choices from Arm 1, Arm 2, and no choice (None) during
20 trials before reversal. Middle panel: Percent choices from Arm 1, Arm
2, and no choice (None) during 20 trials after reversal. Bottom panel:
Control levels for 20 trials before and after the reversal. Zero on abscissa
indicates time of the reversal. Units of control are arbitrary. Sham 
simulated control rats; Lesion  Simulated rats with ACC lesions.
Figure 9. Simulated effects of anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) lesions on
performance of a hypothetical water maze task. Left: percent trials that the
animal reaches the reward location relative to the total number of trials.
Right: percent of actions that the animal spends sitting relative to the total
number of actions taken. Dark: sham control simulations. Light: ACC
lesion simulations. ACC lesions cause a significant decrease in rewarded
activity because of increased overall sitting.
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68 HOLROYD AND MCCLURE
The theory thus proposes a division of labor between striatal and
ACC mechanisms for behavioral regulation. At one level of con-
trol, the striatum selects actions for execution that have high
expected value relative to their energetic costs. At a higher level,
the ACC learns the value of tasks as a whole and applies top-down
control over the striatum to ensure successful task completion.
This organization provides a scaffolding that supports extended
behaviors, particularly when energetic costs would otherwise in-
terfere with performance on the basis of striatal value signals
alone. This account answers why ACC damage can result in
akinetic mutism: Given that all actions require at least some
physical effort, the absence of an organizing goal for action selec-
tion, together with weak distal rewards, can lead to a pseudopa-
ralysis in which the organism fails to move despite being able to do
so.
Delay Maze Task
A final simulation rules out a possible confound, which is that
impaired performance on the barrier maze task following ACC
lesions results not from disruption to a hierarchical representation
of the task, but rather to increased temporal discounting of future
rewards. In principle, rats with ACC damage might eschew large
rewards, requiring high effort if the values of the rewards were
highly discounted. To demonstrate that this is not the case, Rude-
beck, Walton, Smyth, Bannerman, and Rushworth (2006) revealed
a double dissociation between the functions of the orbitofrontal
cortex (OFC) and the ACC on delay discounting versus barrier
versions of the T-maze task. On each trial of the delay discounting
task, rats were again required to choose between two arms of a T
maze containing high and low rewards; however, the rats had to
first submit to a several-second delay to obtain the high reward.
Whereas ACC lesions dramatically impaired performance on the
barrier maze but not on the delay maze, OFC lesions impaired
performance on the delay maze but not on the barrier maze (see
Figure 10). The authors concluded that decision making in the rat
is influenced by two independent neural systems that separately
process delay- and effort-related costs.
To address this issue, we simulated rat performance on the delay
maze and on the barrier maze in Experiments 1 and 2 of Rudebeck
and colleagues (2006). Although our model does not explicitly
represent the OFC, we accounted for the effect of increased tem-
poral discounting related to OFC damage by decreasing the time
discount parameter (
, Equation 4), thereby reducing the effective
strength of the reinforcer at times preceding reward delivery. Trial
sequences and maze specifics (e.g., reward magnitude, barrier
height and delay length for each trial) are described in the methods
section of Rudebeck and colleagues. The barrier maze (Experiment
2 in Rudebeck et al.) was unchanged from the previous simulation
(Figure 4b). The delay maze was represented as a six-cell-long
stem joined perpendicularly at one end to two alleys, each two
cells long (Figure 4d). Subjects were detained between 0 and 20 s
when passing through units (d), represented abstractly as addi-
tional cells that the subject automatically traversed to reach the
reward (seven additional cells per each 5-s increment in delay). For
both the barrier and delay mazes, rewards (r) were delivered at the
end of each arm, with r  1.5 for 1 pellet of food. Values of r and
CL1 (for the barrier maze) were scaled linearly for different
reward amounts and barrier heights, respectively. The effect of
ACC lesions on performance were simulated by setting εL2  0,
as previously. The effect of OFC lesions was simulated by multi-
plying the discount parameter 
 by .9.
Reducing the control term in the simulation spared delay dis-
counting but profoundly disrupted effortful behavior, whereas
reducing the reward discounting parameter produced the converse
result (see Figure 10). This result indicates that reducing the
discount parameter can impair performance on a delayed reward
task while sparing performance on an effort-related task, and
further, that reducing the control parameter can impair perfor-
mance on the effort-related task while sparing performance on the
delay task. Our conclusion therefore agrees with that of Rudebeck
and colleagues (2006): The organizing mechanism implemented
by the ACC can be distinguished from the discounting of future
rewards, which determines the impact of predicted rewards on
present behavior irrespective of the contextual milieu.
Discussion
Holroyd and Yeung (2012) recently proposed the broad thesis
that the ACC functions to motivate extended, goal-directed behav-
iors according to principles of HRL. Here, we formalized these
ideas in a series of simulations that makes explicit the theory’s
underlying assumptions while demonstrating its internal consis-
tency. Although the model simulated rat behavior specifically, its
structure was informed by findings from both rat and primate
literature. This effort advances current thinking on the frontal
medial cortex and ACC function along multiple avenues. First,
going beyond a few previous models that tentatively suggested that
the ACC carries out an actor-related RL role over behavioral
Figure 10. Empirical (solid lines) and simulated (dashed lines) data of
rats engaged in barrier- and delay- versions of the T maze task. The
ordinate indicates the proportion of high reward arm choices for anterior
cingulate cortex (ACC)/orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) lesioned animals to
high reward arm choices for sham-lesioned animals. E. ACC  empirical
data for rats with anterior cingulate cortex lesions; E. OFC  empirical
data for rats with orbitofrontal cortex lesions; S. ACC  simulated data for
rats with anterior cingulate cortex lesions; S. OFC  simulated data for rats
with orbitofrontal cortex lesions. The effects of ACC and OFC lesions were
simulated by reducing the control and discount parameters, respectively.
Note the double dissociation between the effects of ACC and OFC damage
on the barrier and delay versions of the T maze, for both the real and
simulated subjects. Empirical data from Rudebeck et al. (2006).
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69HIERARCHICAL CONTROL OVER EFFORTFUL BEHAVIOR
choice (e.g., Holroyd & Coles, 2002, 2008; Holroyd, Yeung,
Coles, & Cohen, 2005), the model provides a computationally
specific account of the idea that the ACC is responsible for guiding
decision making by associating actions with their outcomes (Rush-
worth et al., 2007; Walton, Rudebeck, et al., 2007). By contrast,
existing computational theories have proposed that the ACC is
more concerned with performance monitoring than with action
generation (e.g., W. H. Alexander & Brown, 2011; Botvinick,
2007; Botvinick et al., 2001; J. W. Brown & Braver, 2005;
Shenhav et al., 2013; Silvetti et al., 2011, in press; but for recent
actor-related alternatives, see Khamassi et al., 2011; Zendehrouh,
Gharibzadeh, & Towhidkhah, 2013, 2014), or have discussed
hierarchical function without reference to the ACC (Dezfouli &
Balleine, 2012; Frank & Badre, 2012; Keramati & Gutkin, 2013).
Second, the model demonstrates how the ACC can assist with
complex RL problems that other neural systems (such as the
striatum) might otherwise solve on their own (Holroyd & Yeung,
2012). Third, the model accounts for the behavioral consequences
of ACC damage—namely, that damage sometimes results in
slowed responding and reduced behavioral output despite other-
wise normal motor ability—whereas functions proposed by other
theories are mostly spared by such damage (Holroyd & Yeung,
2012). And fourth, the simulations indicate a mechanism for
associating abstract task representations underlying cognitive con-
trol (e.g., J. D. Cohen et al., 1990; Kimberg & Farah, 1993) with
reward signals that specify which task to execute as well as how
vigorously the task should be carried out (Umemoto & Holroyd,
2014). In so doing, the model links the ACC literatures on cogni-
tive control (Botvinick et al., 2001) and RL (Holroyd & Coles,
2002; Rushworth et al., 2007; Walton, Rudebeck, et al., 2007) by
providing what is, to our knowledge, the first mechanistic dem-
onstration of how principles of RL can regulate the deployment of
control. We hope that these efforts provide a foundation for further
development and a benchmark for comparison with other compet-
ing models.
Hierarchy and Control
The model develops an earlier hierarchical proposal that the
ACC uses dopamine-related reward signals to select between
action policies (Holroyd & Coles, 2002) in the context of recent
explorations by Botvinick and colleagues into whether biological
systems implement principles of HRL to solve difficult control
problems (Botvinick, 2012; Botvinick, Niv, et al., 2009; Diuk,
Schapiro, et al., 2013; Diuk, Tsai, Wallis, Botvinick, & Niv, 2013;
Ribas-Fernandes et al., 2011). Based on apparent commonalities
between the concepts of options in HRL and task representations
mediated by the DLPFC, Botvinick and colleagues suggested that
the DLFPC serves as a mechanism for option selection and maintenance.
Our proposal is similar to their account, but suggests that the ACC,
rather than the DLPFC, is responsible for option selection and
maintenance (Holroyd & Yeung, 2011, 2012). Notably, Botvinick
and colleagues observed HRL signals in the ACC in a human
neuroimaging study but did not discuss this result in the context of
ACC function (Ribas-Fernandes et al., 2011), perhaps because the
ACC does not play a specific role in their brain-based theory of
HRL (Botvinick, Niv, et al., 2009).
In a separate line of research, Shenhav et al. (2013) recently
proposed an elegant theory that the ACC encodes a quantity called
the “expected value of control” that is utilized by the DLPFC to
regulate the application of top-down control over task execution.
The expected value of control and HRL theories share some salient
commonalities—for example, both theories propose that effortful
control over goal-directed behavior is recruited by the ACC only
when successful task performance is predictive of high payoff
(Dixon & Christoff, 2012)—but only the HRL theory in its present
form explicitly links the principles of control with hierarchy.
Further, whereas the expected value of control theory incorporates
effort-related costs into the control calculations (Shenhav et al.,
2013), the HRL theory of ACC function excludes such costs when
calculating option values. Whether such discrepancies reflect fun-
damental differences between the two theories or are merely
incidental is difficult to ascertain. We suggest that the comparison
could be facilitated if the expected value of control framework
were also instantiated in a computational model.
That effort-related costs are not directly factored into the mo-
del’s action update equation (Equation 4) constitutes an especially
strong model assumption, as it renders the system incapable of
predicting future cost expenditures. Yet because these costs are
evaluated in the action selection algorithm (Equations 1 and 2), the
system tends to avoid selecting actions with high energetic costs
when suitably valuable alternatives are available. In this way, the
system does not predict upcoming effortful behaviors but avoids
choosing such behaviors at the time of action selection. Note that
were the effort-related costs actually learnable, then the striatal and
ACC mechanisms for selection would never conflict: Costs that
were high enough to deter the striatal mechanism from obtaining a
large reward would also devalue the average reward associated
with the superordinate option, resulting in reduced control and a
bias toward less-rewarding outcomes—a possibility that is pre-
cluded by relegating the impact of the costs to the moment of
selection. Despite this assumption, effort-related costs still affect
behavior over the long term: When the gradual reduction of control
by the ACC frees the striatum to avoid actions with high-effort-
related costs, the resulting decrease in reward propels the ACC to
increase control. This feedback–control loop can give the appear-
ance that the ACC learns and applies effort-related costs prospec-
tively when in fact it does not.
In any event, we assume that effort-related costs are unpredict-
able only as a heuristic; our formal position is that such costs are
relatively difficult, if not necessarily impossible, to predict. This
assumption could be relaxed by including a cost term in the action
update equation with an especially small discount parameter
(Equation 4), and a cost term in the option–metaoption reward
learning equation with a relatively small learning rate (Equation 6),
which would render the costs somewhat learnable.
The theory thus proposes that the evaluation of effort-related
costs is qualitatively different from that of unconditioned stimuli
(such as rewards and punishments) that are inherently learnable
and predictable (Boksem & Tops, 2008). It has been observed that
cost estimates of tasks associated with extended physical exertion
or tolerating pain main might be difficult to predict and might
fluctuate (McGuire & Kable, 2013; see also Kahneman, 2000).
Note that effort-related prediction entails not predicting the cost
itself per se (e.g., the amount of pain), but rather the degree of
control that the system can expect to muster in meeting the cost, as
it is the latter rather than the former that determines whether or not
the offending obstacle is actually overcome. Hence, in contrast to
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predicting reward and punishment signals that arise from sources
external to the agent, prediction of effort-related costs entails
predicting the agent’s own internally generated control signal in
relation to an external quantity. These predictions are especially
ambiguous precisely when the required control levels are more or
less equal to the task at hand, just as an elite runner may not be able
to predict whether or not they will win a particular marathon. We
suggest that ACC function is especially necessary for sustaining a
selected option through to its completion when the control de-
mands over option execution are greater than anticipated. At
minimum, the ongoing debate about the putative resource depen-
dence of effortful control underscores the unique nature of this
psychological construct (Inzlicht & Schmeichel, 2012; Inzlicht et
al., 2014; Kurzban et al., 2013).
At the neural level, empirical support for this assumption is
mixed. Similar to our suggestion, Phillips and colleagues have
proposed that the acute effects of dopamine on behavior are
determined based on a comparison between the predictive values
of future reward (as coded by extrasynaptic dopamine concentra-
tions) with the costs required to elicit the rewards, such that
approach behavior is elicited only when the predicted reward value
exceeds a cost-defined threshold (Phillips, Walton, & Jhou, 2007).
Further, they argue that this comparison unfolds in the in the
nucleus accumbens, where dopamine release biases behavior to-
ward predicted rewards in the context of cost-related information
conveyed from the ACC (Phillips et al., 2007; Walton, Kennerley,
Bannerman, Phillips, & Rushworth, 2006). Substantial evidence
that the nucleus accumbens is sensitive to such cost–benefit com-
parisons is partially supportive of this hypothesis (e.g., Botvinick,
Huffstetler, et al., 2009; Cousins, Atherton, Turner, & Salamone,
1996; Cousins & Salamone, 1994; Kurniawan, Guitart-Masip, &
Dolan, 2011; Ostlund, Wassum, Murphy, Balleine, & Maidment,
2011; Salamone, Correa, Farrar, Nunes, & Pardo, 2009; but see
Walton et al., 2009).
More troubling with respect to the model—given that Equation
3 indicates that effort-related costs should not factor into state-
value learning—are recent observations that phasic dopamine re-
lease to cues predictive of forthcoming rewards reflect discounting
of the effort-related costs needed to obtain the rewards (Day,
Jones, & Carelli, 2011; Day, Jones, Wightman, & Carelli, 2010;
Kurniawan et al., 2013; Pasquereau & Turner, 2013). However,
these effort-sensitive dopamine neurons constitute only a small
proportion of the collective midbrain dopamine system, raising the
question as to whether these signals are powerful enough to drive
learning of extended control policies as opposed to simple cue–
outcome associations (Pasquereau & Turner, 2013). Further, other
studies have failed to find effort-related discounting of dopamine
release in the rat nucleus accumbens (Gan, Walton, & Phillips,
2010; Wanat, Kuhnen, & Phillips, 2010) and of BOLD activation
of the human nucleus accumbens (Schmidt, Lebreton, Cléry-
Melin, Daunizeau, & Pessiglione, 2012). Note that the model’s
action selection mechanism (Equation 1) factors effort-related
costs into the decision before the action has actually been carried
out (Equation 2), necessitating a mechanism that predicts effort-
related costs over very short time intervals. In this context, obser-
vations that reward-predictive cues elicit phasic dopamine signals
that are sensitive to effort-related costs (Day et al., 2010, 2011;
Pasquereau & Turner, 2013) may actually reflect the acute ener-
gizing effects of dopamine on behavior, rather than a longer term
learning process that operates over extended sequences of actions
(Pasquereau & Turner, 2013; Phillips et al., 2007).
We note that, in its current form, the model does not store
previous context-specific control levels as a starting point for
future sessions, nor does it provide a mechanism for recruiting
control in the absence of negative prediction errors. Nevertheless,
we argue that the simple control mechanism proposed here can
successfully address many everyday challenges: So long as control
begins in a novel context with a high value, then the system will
gradually relax into a state that simultaneously maximizes average
received reward while minimizing the level of control needed to
achieve it (Hillman & Bilkey, 2010, 2012, 2013; Williams et al.,
1999). Control in rewarding situations then need only be recruited
when performance drops below the average value. This process
could be facilitated by retrieving option-related reward values
from long-term memory storage in the ACC (Euston et al., 2012;
Jung et al., 2008; S. H. Wang et al., 2012). In this case, poor initial
performance would boost the degree of control to a level that
achieves a reward rate commensurate to that retrieved from long-
term store.
Finally, we emphasize that the hierarchical control mechanism
that we have proposed provides a means for exploring solutions to
problems at multiple levels of abstraction simultaneously. To make
this point concrete, imagine the following scenario: That you are
traveling for the first time from your home to a new job located
somewhere across the city. Assume that your objective is to arrive
at work in a timely fashion, and that reward is earned as a linear
function of the distance traveled toward your goal per unit time. In
this case, the metaoption to arrive quickly at work would afford
several specific options: driving, taking the bus, walking, hitch-
hiking, and so on. If you were to select and execute the option for
driving, the average reward received might steadily increase, re-
sulting in reduced control at both the option and metaoption
levels—especially if you are a good driver and can handle the car
relatively automatically. But if the vehicle were suddenly to break
down, then the consequent decrease in reward rate would precip-
itate increased control at both the metaoption and option levels.
Greater control over driving would be ineffectual, but the in-
creased control by the metaoption would facilitate a shift to a
different option, perhaps to taking the bus, and if that strategy
failed, then to still another option such as walking. Once the next
selected option is successful, the rising reward rate would stabilize
the option as the metaoption withdraws control.
Moreover, in parallel to how the metaoption would facilitate
exploration over options, the selected option would facilitate ex-
ploration over actions. To continue with the story, imagine that the
initial leg of your walk from the bus stop begins by going down-
hill, such that you make rapid progress toward your goal and
reward quickly accumulates. Because little effort is required to
walk downhill, the option level would rapidly relinquish control
over behavior. But at the bottom of the hill, the terrain levels out
into a valley that stretches in the wrong direction. In the absence
of control you might find yourself walking the long way around to
your destination. Instead, the sudden decrease in reward rate would
cause a spike in control from the walking option, encouraging you
to explore alternative routes that might be more effortful—for
example, by cutting across a hill with tall grass—but more direct.
In this way, effortful control at both the option and metaoption
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levels ensures thorough exploration of decision space, especially
for naturalistic environments that afford multiple potential actions.
Functional–Neuroanatomical Homologies
Although we developed our model to account for studies of the
rodent medial frontal cortex, we believe that the simulations in-
form understanding of the human medial frontal cortex. Compar-
ison across species is complicated by the fact that putative homol-
ogies between rat and human medial frontal structures have been
perennially controversial (Balleine & O’Doherty, 2010; V. J.
Brown & Bowman, 2002; Laubach, 2011; Preuss, 1995; Seamans
et al., 2008; Uylings, Groenewegen, & Kolb, 2003; Vogt, 2009;
Vogt et al., 2013; Vogt & Paxinos, 2014; Wallis, 2012). An
ongoing debate has centered on whether the rat medial prefrontal
cortex is homologous to the human medial prefrontal cortex or to
the human DLPFC (Laubach, 2011). In fact, the rat medial frontal
cortex appears to combine aspects of both structures at a rudimen-
tary level (Seamans et al., 2008). An old scheme defines the rat
frontal midline as containing the ACC, which consists of areas
Cg1, Cg2, and the dorsal ACC, as well as the prelimbic cortex and
infralimbic cortex (Rushworth, Walton, Kennerley, & Bannerman,
2004). The prelimbic cortex, infralimbic cortex, and ACC are
observed to cooperate for effecting goal-directed behavior, yet
their functions are dissociable (e.g., Chudasama et al., 2003; Dal-
ley, Cardinal, & Robbins, 2004; Dias & Aggleton, 2000; Killcross
& Coutureau, 2003; Ragozzino, 2007). In primates, motor areas in
the cingulate sulcus in the caudal ACC project directly to the
spinal cord (Dum & Strick, 1996), basal ganglia (Takada et al.,
2001), and other motor areas (Morecraft & Tanji, 2009). However,
the rat frontal midline does not contain a cingulate sulcus, and so
contains no cingulate motor areas per se (Vogt, 2009; Vogt &
Paxinos, 2014; Vogt et al., 2013). Rather, the densest projections
to the spinal cord (M. W. Miller, 1987) and basal ganglia (Gabbott,
Warner, Jays, Salway, & Busby, 2005; Laubach, 2011) emanate
from a pregenual area in the rat ACC corresponding to parts of
Area 32 and Area 24. It has been suggested that this region, which
corresponds approximately to the dorsal ACC and receives pro-
jections from the prelimbic cortex (Jones, Groenewegen, & Witter,
2005), resembles the primate motor areas in the ACC sulcus
(Rushworth et al., 2004; Vogt et al., 2013). Although not explicitly
modeled here, the proposed pathway from the prelimbic cortex to
the striatum via the ACC may parallel a direct prelimbic–striatal
pathway that facilitates task shifts (Goto & Grace, 2005).
Our assertion that the function of the rodent medial frontal
cortex is organized along a rostral–caudal hierarchy of control is
supported by evidence of such a hierarchy in the human frontal
cortex (Badre & D’Esposito, 2007, 2009; Badre & Frank, 2012;
Collins et al., 2014; Dixon et al., 2014; Jeon & Friederici, 2013;
Koechlin & Summerfield, 2007; Kouneiher et al., 2009; O’Reilly,
2010; Orr & Banich, 2014), but several studies have recently
challenged this view (Crittenden & Duncan, 2014; Farooqui et al.,
2012; Reynolds et al., 2012). Further, there is reason to question
whether hierarchies of arbitrary depth can be mapped to different
brain areas. Clearly the rigid association that we have proposed
between three hierarchical levels and three neuroanatomical struc-
tures would be inflexible for many complex, real-world problems.
Partly for this reason, we previously speculated that multilevel
problems could be flexibly translated into series of two-level
problems that are recursively loaded into working memory (Hol-
royd & Yeung, 2011), but evidence now seems more consistent
with the existence of a rostral–caudal hierarchy along the midline.
Alternatively, the frontal midline might encode emergent solutions
that are intermediate to these two extremes (Dixon et al., 2014):
Hierarchical problems could be flexibly decomposed into their
components and subcomponents along the rostral–caudal extent of
the ACC to the degree of coarseness necessary to accommodate
the entire depth of the hierarchy. The upper limit on the number of
levels could be constrained by the availability of stripes—groups
of interconnected neurons in the frontal cortex that have been
estimated to number about 20,000 (Frank, Loughry, & O’Reilly,
2001).
Despite this debate, there is good reason to believe that regions
of the medial frontal cortex share functional correspondences
between rodents, nonhuman primates, and humans. As noted the
ACC in rats (Cowen et al., 2012; Hauber & Sommer, 2009;
Hillman & Bilkey, 2010, 2012; Walton et al., 2002) and the caudal
ACC in primates (Botvinick, Huffstetler, et al., 2009; Croxson et
al., 2009; Davis et al., 2000; Kurniawan et al., 2013; Mulert et al.,
2008; Paus et al., 1998; Prévost et al., 2010) are both plainly
sensitive to effortful costs, suggesting a functional homology be-
tween these areas across species. And as we have argued, lesions
of this area in humans result in reduced motor output despite
normal motor ability (Holroyd & Yeung, 2012), in apparent cor-
respondence with the effect of ACC lesions on rat behavior (Wal-
ton et al., 2002). Moreover, detailed examination of ACC activity
from rats (Balaguer-Ballester, Lapish, Seamans, & Durstewitz,
2011; Cowen et al., 2012; Cowen & McNaughton, 2007; Durst-
ewitz, Vittoz, Floresco, & Seamans, 2010; Fujisawa, Amarasing-
ham, Harrison, & Buzsáki, 2008; Hyman, Ma, Balaguer-Ballester,
Durstewitz, & Seamans, 2012; Lapish, Durstewitz, Chandler, &
Seamans, 2008; Ma et al., 2014; Mulder, Nordquist, Orgüt, &
Pennartz, 2003; see also Ostlund, Winterbauer, & Balleine, 2009)
to monkeys (Hayden et al., 2011; Procyk & Joseph, 2001; Shidara,
Mizuhiki, & Richmond, 2005; Shidara & Richmond, 2002) and
humans (Badre & Wagner, 2004; Duncan, 2010; Woodward et al.,
2006) provides converging evidence across species that the region
is responsible for managing transitions between successive task
stages, consonant with application of top-down control by the
ACC over each action within an option sequence, or recurrent
information fed back to the ACC upon each action’s completion
(Holroyd & Yeung, 2012). These brain areas also produce elec-
trophysiological signals of error and reward processing observed
in both rats (Narayanan, Cavanagh, Frank, & Laubach, 2013;
Warren, Hyman, Seamans, & Holroyd, 2014) and humans (M. X.
Cohen, 2011; Walsh & Anderson, 2012), supporting the functional
convergence between the rat ACC and human caudal ACC pro-
posed here.
The human rostral ACC also appears to be functionally homol-
ogous with the rat prelimbic cortex. As described, direct record-
ings from neurons in the prelimbic cortex (Rich & Shapiro, 2009)
and disruption of prelimbic cortex function (Birrell & Brown,
2000; Floresco, Block, & Tse, 2008; Ragozzino et al., 1999;
Stefani & Moghaddam, 2005) strongly implicate this region in
facilitating shifts between tasks. Further, direct connections from
the prelimbic cortex to the dorsal ACC (Jones et al., 2005) facil-
itate neuronal synchronization between these regions (Totah, Jack-
son, & Moghaddam, 2013). Consistent with these observations and
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72 HOLROYD AND MCCLURE
with the hierarchical assumption of the present simulations, func-
tional neuroimaging evidence in humans indicates that rostral
ACC activity biases task processing in the caudal ACC (Nakao et
al., 2010), such that the rostral ACC appears to regulate task
selection and the caudal ACC implements task execution (Dixon &
Christoff, 2012; Haynes et al., 2007; Venkatraman & Huettel,
2012; Venkatraman, Rosati, Taren, & Huettel, 2009; see also
Haruno & Kawato, 2006). Although the foci of these rostral
activations span a range of ACC areas from the pregenual ACC
(y  34, z  35 in Talairach coordinates; Venkatraman & Huettel,
2012) to rostral portions of the anterior midcingulate cortex (y 
56, z  16; Nakao et al., 2010), in all cases the activations occur
anterior to a caudal focus of ACC activity concerned with rela-
tively subordinate aspects of task execution. Rostral ACC activa-
tion is also negatively correlated with shifting performance in task
switching (Wager, Jonides, Smith, & Nichols, 2005; see also
Pollmann, Weidner, Müller, & von Cramon, 2000), and consistent
with the assumed function of the prelimbic cortex, lesions of the
rostral ACC near the genu of the corpus callosum impair task
switching in humans, as indicated by lesion-symptom mapping of
a large neuropsychological test battery data set obtained from 344
individuals with focal brain lesions (Gläscher et al., 2012). By
contrast, as would be predicted by the hypothesis that the caudal
ACC is responsible for energizing behavior, lesions of the caudal
ACC in this same study were associated with impaired perfor-
mance on a measure of word generation.
In contrast to our proposal that the rodent ACC controls the
striatum directly, we have previously suggested that the primate
ACC controls striatal action selection indirectly via its influence
over DLFPC activity (Holroyd & Yeung, 2012; Umemoto &
Holroyd, 2014; cf. Shenhav et al., 2013). Consistent with this idea,
connections from Area 32 in the rostral ACC in primates target
neurons in the DLPFC that are responsible for top-down control
over behavior (Medalla & Barbas, 2009, 2010), and damage to the
DLPFC in humans induces strategic impairments in task switching
comparable with those observed following damage to the rat
prelimbic cortex (Munakata, Morton, & Stedron, 2003; O’Reilly,
Noelle, Braver, & Cohen, 2002). We propose that this apparent
separation of function in primates between brain areas responsible
for task selection (ACC) and task implementation (DLPFC) may
afford computational advantages comparable with that achieved by
dissociating the action and evaluative components of actor–critic
models of behavior (Sutton & Barto, 1998). This view suggests
that previous observations of greater ACC–DLPFC coactivation
with increasing task difficulty, which occurs independently of the
details of motor execution (Koski & Paus, 2000), may reflect
transmission of a bias signal from the ACC to the DLPFC for task
selection and motivation (Holroyd & Yeung, 2012; Umemoto &
Holroyd, 2014). The HRL theory also suggests that the withdrawal
of support by the ACC from a control-demanding task will result
in a gradual decay in performance as memory for the task declines
over time (Altmann, 2002), leading to goal neglect and persevera-
tive activity (Duncan, Emslie, Williams, Johnson, & Freer, 1996;
Morton & Munakata, 2002; Munakata et al., 2003).
The Role of Dopamine
The model also provides insight into a wealth of evidence that
has associated tonic dopamine levels with the working memory
functions of the medial frontal cortex (Floresco & Magyar, 2006;
Seamans & Yang, 2004). In particular, at a network-wide level,
tonic dopamine appears to regulate the gain of cortical neurons in
order to stabilize information held in working memory against
distracters or neural noise (Durstewitz & Seamans, 2008; Servan-
Schreiber, Printz, & Cohen, 1990; Thurley, Senn, & Lüscher,
2008). Stimulation of the midbrain dopamine system also elicits
sustained neural firing of bistable neurons in the ACC (Onn &
Wang, 2005; Peters, Barnhardt, & O’Donnell, 2004), which evi-
dently functions to update the contents of working memory (Baeg
et al., 2003; D’Ardenne et al., 2012; Petit et al., 1998). Reward-
related changes of cortical dopamine levels also partly depend on
the relative amount of work required to achieve the reward (Rich-
ardson & Gratton, 1998).
We found that disruption of tonic dopamine levels in the medial
frontal cortex, which we simulated by setting the average reward
values of the selected metaoption (for the prelimbic cortex) and
option (for the ACC) to zero, adversely affected task performance
in a manner comparable with direct lesions of dopaminergic nu-
clei. In both cases, this manipulation ensured that the rewards
received were evaluated by the affected systems as being better
than expected, resulting in reduced control over the lower levels
even as performance deteriorated. As well, according to HRL
theory, a selected option must be actively sustained until its com-
pletion (Botvinick, Niv, et al., 2009). Given the fundamental
concern of the frontal cortex with maintaining task goals in work-
ing memory (E. K. Miller & Cohen, 2001), we have assumed that
the rat medial frontal cortex maintains the selected options and
metaoptions in working memory. These considerations suggest
that tonic dopamine levels code for a threshold that determines the
degree to which an option should be maintained in working mem-
ory. Outcomes that miss this target result in increased activation of
the option in working memory, providing additional top-down
support over task performance in order to boost the reward rate.
Conversely, outcomes that surpass the target allow for the option
to decay from working memory, because, in this case, the target
reward rate can be maintained in the absence of control. Disruption
to tonic dopamine levels thus sets this threshold to an artificially
low level, which allows the contents of working memory to be
emptied and control to dissipate freely (see also Floresco, Magyar,
Ghods-Sharifi, Vexelman, & Tse, 2006; Nagano-Saito et al., 2008;
Tunbridge, Bannerman, Sharp, & Harrison, 2004).
Model Fits and Future Directions
The model simulations are not perfect. For example, Figure 6
indicates that, following changes in task contingencies, the model
immediately adopts a stable rate of performance, whereas the
empirical data suggest a slower rate of adaptation. Although it
would be possible to account for such differences by equipping the
model with additional degrees of freedom (e.g., by introducing a
perseverative bias that slows between-arm switches), we elected
not to make any such changes in order to focus the discussion on
the core principles of the theory: hierarchy, control, and reinforce-
ment. Likewise, the model performs worse than actual rats do on
the reversal learning task (Figure 3, bottom panels). This discrep-
ancy likely arises from the fact that the model does not include a
module for OFC function, which is widely believed to facilitate
reversal learning (Boulougouris, Dalley, & Robbins, 2007; Burke,
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Takahashi, Correll, Brown, & Schoenbaum, 2009; Hornak et al.,
2004; Schoenbaum, Roesch, Stalnaker, & Takahashi, 2009; see
also Wheeler & Fellows, 2008). We decided not to include such a
module in order to highlight the functions of the ACC and pre-
limbic cortex, but doing so would be an important step for incor-
porating ACC function within a complete neural model of reward
processing and action selection.
Although it has previously been suggested that ACC damage
shifts the relative weight that the system accords to rewards versus
effort-related costs in a one-level cost–benefit analysis (e.g., Wal-
ton et al., 2006), the HRL theory provides a mechanism whereby
such control can be targeted to specific tasks. Consistent with this
assertion, optogenetic stimulation of medial frontal cortex neurons
that selectively project to the dorsal raphe nucleus (DRN), a
serotonergic nucleus, induces task-dependent behavioral activa-
tion: Whereas direct stimulation of the DRN increases mobility
overall, indirect stimulation of the DRN, by way of the medial
frontal cortex, increases mobility only in a challenging task
(Warden et al., 2012; see also Welberg, 2013). By contrast, the
anterior portion of the dorsal medial striatum appears to moti-
vate or energize behavior overall rather than in a task-specific
way (A. Y. Wang, Miura, & Uchida, 2013; see also Levy &
Dubois, 2006; Schmidt et al., 2008). This aspect of the theory
could be further tested in an experiment that exercised all three
levels of the hierarchy simultaneously, for example, with a
task-switching design in which multiple tasks demanded vary-
ing degrees of effortful control. A straightforward prediction of
the model would be that rats allocate effort specific to the
demands of each task, rather than according to a flat cost–
benefit analysis, and that this allocation depends on the integ-
rity of the ACC.
How options are established in the first place is an open question
for future research. We have speculated elsewhere that a repertoire
of options may be learned during the course of early development
(Lukie, Montazer-Hojat, & Holroyd, 2014). In this view, new
options would be generated in a trial-and-error learning process
sustained by an intrinsic motivation to explore (Singh, Barto, &
Chentanez, 2005), which could later be recombined in combina-
torial fashion to address more complex problems (Elman, Bates,
Johnson, & Karmiloff-Smith, 1996). Options could also be formed
around the learning of latent high-level structure in the environ-
ment (Gershman & Niv, 2010, 2012), and/or by identifying sub-
goals through a structural analysis of the task domain (Diuk,
Schapiro, et al., 2013). But it is also the case that many options
must be fashioned on the fly, for example, according to the task
instructions given to subjects in a psychology experiment. In
general, this is an outstanding issue in both psychology and arti-
ficial intelligence, and, as such, exceeds the scope of the present
investigation.
Our account was motivated by the observation that previous
research on ACC function has focused on detailed examinations of
moment-to-moment changes in control, thereby overlooking the
higher level structure associated with more extended, everyday
activities (Holroyd & Yeung, 2012). Foraging provides an instruc-
tive example of such a naturalistic behavior. This activity is shared
between birds in the wild and humans at the mall (Stephens,
Brown, & Ydenberg, 2007), and, like so many other behaviors, is
associated with ACC activity in rats (Hillman & Bilkey, 2012),
monkeys (Blanchard & Hayden, 2014; Hayden et al., 2011), and
humans (Kolling, Behrens, Mars, & Rushworth, 2012). However,
unlike most other behaviors, foraging is also specifically impaired
by ACC damage in rats (Li et al., 2012; Seamans, Floresco, &
Phillips, 1995). Current explanations of the role of the ACC in
foraging hold that the ACC codes the average value of the foraging
environment and the cost of foraging (Kolling et al., 2012), or is
responsible for overriding the pursuit of immediate rewards asso-
ciated with the fruit at hand in favor of more delayed rewards to be
found at a distal source (Shenhav et al., 2013). ACC activity is also
observed to motivate changes in behavioral strategies rather than
to affect current decision making (Blanchard & Hayden, 2014).
Our model can be thought of as a computational approach that
formalizes these presumed functions. It does so by couching the
contribution of the ACC to foraging within a hierarchal motor
control system: Foraging is characterized by collections of rela-
tively primitive actions during resource exploitation (such as fish-
ing from a pond), punctuated by high-level strategic shifts during
resource exploration (such as deciding to leave a pond in search of
a new pond). If the principles of the model indeed generalize to
humans, then the model predicts that the caudal ACC implements
individual tasks (such as fishing vs. walking) and the rostral ACC
(which is sensitive to the overall value of the environment as
opposed to the specific values of either fishing or walking) sup-
ports the shift between tasks. This prediction can be tested by
recording the fMRI BOLD signal from humans immersed in a
virtual foraging task.
Conclusion
Our critique of current theories of ACC function was predicated
on the observation that ACC lesions tend to spare performance on
experimental tasks that depend on those proposed functions (Hol-
royd & Yeung, 2012). Yet apart from rare accounts of akinetic
mutism, the effect of ACC damage on humans is often subtle and
nonapparent, even in everyday life. The earliest clinical observa-
tions noted that a person with ACC damage “shows nothing
obviously unusual in his behavior when one sees him, meets him
or talks to him: to all intents and purposes he is normal” (Tow &
Whitty, 1953, p. 192). Closer examination revealed that such
patients exhibit a subtle array of deficits, including reduced drive
and less interest in engaging in creative activities (Tow & Whitty,
1953). Conversely, stimulation of the ACC (as discussed in the
introduction) motivates effortful behaviors in humans much as it
motivates rats to climb large barriers, especially to execute ex-
tended sequences of actions directed toward larger task goals like
traveling miles to pass through a storm. The HRL theory accounts
for such observations by proposing that the ACC applies the
motivational control necessary to engage in specific activities as a
task-related whole (such as learning to play the piano) rather than
the effort needed to initiate any actions in particular (such as
pressing the individual keys). This discrepancy between the ACC’s
apparently paramount role in cognitive control and decision mak-
ing, on the one hand, and the seemingly modest consequences of
ACC damage on these processes, on the other, underscores the fact
that the current tests of ACC function are relatively insensitive to
the longer term aspects of control regulation. On the contrary, the
HRL theory suggests that the effects of ACC damage will manifest
most strongly on extended, naturalistic tasks rather than on the
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tests of short-term control that characterize conventional labora-
tory investigations of ACC function.
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